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Rule and Revenue in Egypt and Rome: Political  
Stability and Fiscal Institutions 
Andrew Monson ∗ 
Abstract: »Herrschaft und Staatseinkommen in Ägypten 
und Rom: Zur Wechselwirkung von Politischer Stabilität 
und Besteuerung«. This paper investigates what determines 
fiscal institutions and the burden of taxation using a case 
study from ancient history. It evaluates Levi’s model of 
taxation in the Roman Republic, according to which rulers’ 
high discount rates in periods of political instability encour-
age them to adopt a more predatory fiscal regime. The evi-
dence for fiscal reform in the transition from the Republic 
to the Principate seems to support her hypothesis but re-
mains a matter of debate among historians. Egypt’s transi-
tion from a Hellenistic kingdom to a Roman province under 
the Principate provides an analogous case for which there 
are better data. The Egyptian evidence shows a correlation 
between rulers’ discount rates and fiscal regimes that is 
consistent with Levi’s hypothesis. 
1. Introduction 
Explicit rational choice models are lacking in studies of Greek and Roman 
political history with few exceptions (Quillin 2002; 2004). Most ancient histo-
rians avoid discussing the underlying behavioral assumptions of politics and 
opening them to criticism or potential falsification. Often the impetus for theo-
retical debate has to come from social scientists willing to venture into ancient 
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history. The topic of this paper was treated in one chapter of Levi’s book Of 
Rule and Revenue (1988), which introduces a rational choice model for Roman 
taxation. The latter is part of the growing social scientific literature concerning 
the determinants of fiscal policies, in which the rational choice approach plays 
a leading role (Campbell 1993; Swedberg 2003; Persson and Tabellini 2000; 
Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Weingast 2002; Weingast and Wittmann 2006). 
This research is still concentrated on modern industrialized states but there 
have been a few bold attempts to theorize about taxation in agrarian states and 
to trace developments over longer periods (Ardant 1971; Bates 1981; Gold-
smith 1987; Mann 1988; Tilly 1992; Kiser 1994). Such work bears on the de-
bates among professional ancient historians and offers, if nothing else, an op-
portunity for interdisciplinary dialogue. Several recent conferences and 
programmatic articles suggest that scholars are beginning to combine social 
scientific and ancient historical research (Morris and Weingast 2004; Morris 
and Manning 2005; Manning and Morris 2005; Morris et al. forthcoming; Ober 
forthcoming). As the theory of taxation becomes more sophisticated, history 
promises to become a fertile testing ground for how well competing models 
explain variations across cultures, regime types, and longer time-spans (Camp-
bell 1993: 175).  
This paper has more modest goals. It takes as its starting point Levi’s hy-
pothesis that the transition from the Roman Republic to the Principate in the 
late first century BC brought political stability, which led to rationally calcu-
lated fiscal reforms. It examines the effects of this transition in Egypt where 
there is abundant evidence due to the survival of administrative and tax docu-
ments on papyrus and potsherds (Bagnall 1995). Egypt is also an interesting 
comparison because it was not ruled by Rome during the Republican period but 
by the Ptolemaic dynasty, which took over after Alexander the Great conquered 
Egypt. The internal political conditions in the Ptolemaic kingdom resemble 
those in the troubled period in Rome during the fall of the Republic. When it 
became part of the Roman Empire in 30 BC, Egypt enjoyed much the same 
relief from political instability as other provinces. It is thus a partially inde-
pendent case with which to evaluate the correlation between stability and taxa-
tion hypothesized by Levi. This falls far short of the synthesis of recent social 
scientific approaches that might contribute further insights into the workings of 
ancient fiscal policy. The aim is rather to present the basic thesis that rulers and 
their agents rationally manipulate fiscal institutions to maximize their revenue. 
The notion of rulers as stationary bandits and its implications for economic 
development have been worked out most fully by Olson (1993; 2000), whose 
ideas align with the argument of this paper. 
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2. Rome from Republic to Principate 
Levi presents a predatory model of the state where rulers seek to maximize 
their revenues within the constraints imposed by their bargaining power, by 
transaction costs, and by discount rates. She applies this model to the develop-
ment of tax farming in the Roman Republic. Tax farmers (or publicani) were 
private contractors who bid in public auctions to collect state revenue or to 
supply public services on behalf of the state, paying in advance and bearing the 
risks of any shortfall. By the late Republican period they were organized into 
sophisticated associations with wealthy and powerful investors who overlapped 
increasingly with Rome’s political elite (Badian 1972; Malmendier 2002). Levi 
attributes the system to transaction costs such as the costs of measurement and 
monitoring compliance that arose as Rome expanded into larger and more 
unfamiliar territory. But she admits that the reliance on tax farmers may have 
raised transaction costs as much as it lowered them and that the underlying 
difficulties involved in ruling a vast territory with a relatively small bureauc-
racy were as acute in the early Empire when tax farmers’ influence waned 
(Levi 1988: 93). Hence her discussion of the origins of the tax-farming system 
in Rome is less convincing and anyway more difficult to evaluate given the 
nature of the early Roman evidence (Kiser 1994).  
More persuasive is the explanation for why the tax-farming system flour-
ished in the Republic but declined in the Principate. Discounts rates of rulers 
and their agents are the crucial factor. Rational actors discount the value of fu-
ture revenue in relation to present revenue when the future becomes less cer-
tain. In other words, the present value of future income equals its expected 
value minus a discount rate, which increases with uncertainty. While a different 
taxation policy might stimulate productivity and create higher future revenue, a 
high discount rate would favor one that maximized short-term revenue. This 
reasoning suggests an alternative explanation for tax farming, one in which war 
and regime-survival are the principal determinants of fiscal institutions (Tilly 
1992; Eich and Eich 2005). In hindsight the rise of the Roman Empire is too 
easily seen as inevitable but from the Gallic sack of Rome in 390 BC until the 
Augustan settlement in 27 BC, Rome’s ruling elite suffered under both real and 
imagined threats from external and, increasingly, internal enemies. Rome’s eli-
tes had high discount rates and preferred rotating offices, whose rent-seeking 
opportunities in the provinces were used to finance electoral campaigns and 
intra-elite competition. This forestalled the development of a professional bu-
reaucracy, which might have lent itself to autocracy and fallen into the hands of 
their political opponents. 
The effect of discount rates is evident not only in how ruling elites manipu-
late fiscal policy but how their agents, whether subordinate officials or tax 
farmers, maximize their own revenues. Weber argued that the burden on the 
taxpayers would depend primarily on the relative bargaining power of the tax 
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farmer and the “political lord” or ruler (Weber 1968: 965-6). He suggested that 
the tax farmer was likely to extract as much immediate revenue as possible and 
was limited only by the political lord who had rights to future revenue and 
hence an aversion to the diminishing returns of over-exploitation. The same 
logic presumably applies to other state agents, particularly Rome’s provincial 
governors, who were repeatedly implicated in collusion with tax farmers and 
fiscal exploitation of their provinces during their limited term of office while 
the Roman state was unable to constrain them effectively (Kiser 1994: 289-91). 
While Weber’s insight is similar to Levi’s, it is based on the assumption that 
rulers’ discount rates were uniformly low by contrast with private tax collec-
tors. Levi supposes that rulers were equally predatory and adopted more intru-
sive fiscal policies as their discount rates increased (Levi 1988: 74, 93).  
The primary burden of late Republican taxation fell on the provincial popu-
lation rather than on Italy. Direct taxes on Italian land were suspended in 167 
BC and indirect taxes on various transactions were further abolished in Italy by 
60 BC (Neesen 1980: 11). The tax burden was a logical reflection of the distri-
bution of political power. By the mid-second century Rome’s dominance was 
felt throughout the Mediterranean. At the time tribute was suspended in Italy in 
167 BC, Roman was redrawing the political map of Macedonia and arbitrating 
unilaterally the dispute between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms in the 
East. The collective action problem on the Roman periphery, that is, the prob-
lem of concerted resistance or bargaining among widely dispersed and ethni-
cally diverse peoples, gave the Italian countryside and the urban residents of 
Rome, on which Rome depended for recruits, huge bargaining power for 
wealth redistribution (Scheidel 2007). In the face of riots on the streets of the 
capital, political elites from the conservative Cato the Younger to the populist 
Julius Caesar made the rational choice to hand out free grain extracted from 
Rome’s empire (Plutarch, Cato the Younger 26; Appian, Civil War II 48; Garn-
sey 1988: 198-200; Erdkamp 2002: 99-100). It illustrates the urban-bias phe-
nomenon, namely, that mobs in capital cities are easier to organize and hence 
exert more influence over public policy and fiscal institutions than dispersed 
rural or peripheral populations (Bates 1981; Ades and Glaeser 1995, 216-8). It 
also reflects the rulers’ high discount rates, as immediate stability outweighs 
the deleterious long-term effects of rural flight and urban overcrowding. 
The civil wars would have made political elites’ discount rates higher and 
increased the fiscal pressure on the periphery. Only when Caesar defeated his 
opposition did he undertake to lower the tax burden in the provinces, replacing 
tax farmers with officials for the collection of direct taxes in Asia in 48 BC and 
allegedly reducing its burden by one third (Plutarch, Caesar 48). Admittedly, 
his finances in 47 BC were not yet in order (Brunt 1990: 380). His assassina-
tion in 44 BC once again threw Rome’s elites into uncertainty and civil war. 
His murders, Cassius and Brutus, supposedly levied ten years of taxes in Asia 
in a single year and subsequently Mark Antony extracted another nine years of 
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taxes from Asia for his struggle with Octavian. The latter’s situation was so 
desperate that he had to reintroduce direct and indirect taxes on Italian land and 
Roman citizens, mobilizing the wealth of Italy against his rival (Neeson 1980: 
1-16; Brunt 1981). It was a struggle for survival among competing elites and 
their factions, who were willing to do economic harm to both provincials and 
Romans to secure their own future dominance. 
Octavian’s victory and the transition from Republic to Principate form a 
crucial link in the logic of Levi’s argument. She maintains that the discount rate 
of Rome’s new regime would be comparatively low. Hence the elimination of 
tax farming for direct taxes in the Principate both in Italy and in the provinces 
provides empirical support for the theoretical model. However, the fiscal re-
forms of Augustus and his immediate successors are obscure on many points. 
Caesar’s reforms and similar relief of the periphery under Augustus and Tibe-
rius may have ended tax farming for most direct taxes and given cities fiscal 
autonomy but did not eliminate tax farming altogether (Brunt 1990; De Ligt 
2004). Moreover, it is conceivable that even where the form of taxation 
changed, the burden of taxation on the provinces increased or remained the 
same. If Augustus and his successors were more concerned with immediate 
revenue than with their long-term economic prosperity, then one would expect 
them to use their newly won monopoly of military power to raise taxes rather 
than lower them. 
Testing Levi’s hypothesis with a closer examination of the historical sources 
from the provinces outside Egypt proves more difficult than one might wish. 
Most scholars seem to accept that the burden of taxation became lower in the 
provinces under the Principate (Jones 1974: 164-8; Goffart 1974: 16; Rathbone 
1996: 322). However, the entire empire was marked by regional differences in 
fiscal institutions that stem partly from each province’s earlier history. In many 
cases, there was probably continuity with preexisting tax systems and their 
customary rates. What was new was the development of regular censuses by 
which Roman officials could more accurately assess the total capitation tax and 
tribute required (Brunt 1981; Christol 2006). Even if political stability might 
facilitate direct taxation by making such a census easier to undertake, it need 
not increase the tax burden overall. When territory is lost or tax collection is 
disrupted in some areas during periods of instability, the burden is likely to 
become that much more ruinous for more vulnerable populations. The census 
on the other hand could help distribute the tax burden more evenly across the 
population. Moreover, where local urban magistrates took over the collection 
of the fixed tribute from tax farmers, one would on the face of it expect the 
burden to decrease, as private Roman investors would be cut out of their prof-
its. In theory, the census should have ensured fixed payments proportional to 
the population whereas higher productivity would lead to higher taxes under 
the tax farming system (Brunt 1990: 380; Jones 1974: 165; Bartlett 1994: 292) 
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but the census might conceivably have been used as a pretext to raise taxes as 
well (Rathbone 1996: 322-3). 
The thesis of Rostovtzeff’s influential Social and Economic History of the 
Roman World (1926) was that the Roman provinces and their urban “bourgeoi-
sie” flourished in the Principate due to agricultural intensification, increasing 
trade, and urbanization, driven by economic liberalization relative to the Re-
public and the Hellenistic kingdoms that preceded it. Proponents of this thesis, 
including Rostovtzeff, have placed too much emphasis on commerce, urban 
manufacturing, and capitalist investment, underestimating the agrarian basis of 
the ancient economy (Rostovtzeff 1957 [1926]; Oertel 1934). Yet despite dec-
ades of criticism and the abandonment of many ancillary claims, the basic 
proposition that an urban elite in the provinces flourished thanks to secure 
property rights and a fiscal regime conducive to productive investment under 
the relatively stable early Principate has not been convincingly refuted.  
Egypt once seemed to be an exception to this trend, which was troubling be-
cause it happens to be the one province for which there is abundant evidence. 
Egyptian grain was needed to feed the city of Rome, so the emperors, accord-
ing to the traditional view, simply took over Egypt’s centralized bureaucracy 
with its oppressive taxation and land tenure system. This did not seriously 
undermine Rostovtzeff’s thesis thanks to the widely accepted peculiarity, or 
Sonderstellung, of Egypt in the Roman Empire. In the last thirty years a revi-
sionist school has effectively challenged the Sonderstellung argument and with 
it the argument for continuity between Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt. It increas-
ingly appears that Egypt fits within the broad pattern of urbanization, civic 
reforms, privatization, and economic growth in the Roman Empire (Lewis 
1970; 1984; Rathbone 1989; 1993; 2000; Bowman and Rathbone 1992; Bag-
nall 2005). The older view that the early Roman emperors ruthlessly exploited 
Egypt now seems to be based on a mistaken interpretation of the sources 
(Milne 1927; Rostovtzeff 1929). In the following sections, I draw on new evi-
dence that provides support for the view that the fiscal reforms in the early 
Principate lowered tax burdens following the establishment of political stabil-
ity. While this result cannot automatically be applied to the rest of the Roman 
Empire, it ought to stimulate comparison and reevaluation of the sources. If 
nothing else, it presents a partially independent case that is consistent with 
Levi’s hypothesis. 
3. Political Instability in Ptolemaic Egypt 
Egypt is an interesting test case for the model of predatory rule because the 
political conditions in Ptolemaic Egypt were similar to those in the Roman 
Republic but it was formally an independent kingdom before 30 BC and only 
afterwards subject to Rome’s fiscal regime. When Alexander the Great died in 
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323 BC, one of his generals, Ptolemy, became the governor of Egypt as he 
contended with other generals for dominance of the eastern Mediterranean. In 
305 BC Ptolemy declared himself king and pharaoh of Egypt, establishing a 
dynasty that would last until its last queen Cleopatra VII and Mark Antony 
were defeated and Egypt was annexed to Rome in 30 BC. During this period 
and particularly during the second and first centuries BC, Egypt witnessed a 
major civil war or revolt at least once in every generation. As rulers with high 
discount rates, Levi’s model predicts that the Ptolemies would likewise have 
favored policies that maximized short-run revenues over long-run economic 
growth. Moreover, the discount rate of officials and state-agents would simi-
larly increase as the regime became unstable and as the long-term incentives 
for fulfilling one’s duties diminished relative to the short-term rewards of pre-
dation. From this atmosphere of instability in Ptolemaic Egypt emerged many 
of the same abusive fiscal practices that characterized the late Roman Republic. 
Some historians attribute the cause of domestic unrest in Ptolemaic Egypt to 
excessive taxation and predatory officials, while others interpret them as mani-
festations of religious or nationalist, anti-Greek feelings (Préaux 1936; Pere-
mans 1978; McGing 1997; Veïsse 2004). An engagement with the social scien-
tific literature on revolts would probably enrich this fruitless scholarly debate 
(Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1991). Economic deprivation undoubtedly contrib-
uted to the Egyptian revolts. However, it is questionable whether the causality 
goes from fiscal abuse to political instability. In this section, I explore the op-
posite causal relationship, arguing that the instability of the Ptolemaic regime, 
for which the threat of revolt was partly responsible, generated incentives for 
oppressive fiscal policies and official misconduct. Naturally, such a response 
could exacerbate economic deprivation and lead to a vicious circle of unrest 
and predation but the stability of the regime was the main determinant that 
could break the cycle if order were restored. This provides an interpretive 
framework for explaining Ptolemaic fiscal policies, which previous scholars 
simply take as given or ascribe to the kings’ greediness and lavish lifestyles 
caricatured in the literary sources (Polybius, Histories V 34; Strabo, Geography 
17.1.11; Green 1990: 554-5). 
A brief historical overview will convey the level of instability (Green 1990; 
McGing 1997; Hölbl 2001). At its peak in the early third century BC, the dy-
nasty maintained an overseas empire. In the late third century BC, the regime 
came under increasing pressure from both internal and external competitors. 
Egyptian revolts followed military campaigns against the Seleucid Empire in 
245 BC and 217 BC in Syria-Palestine. For twenty years from 205 to 185 BC, 
all of southern Egypt revolted and broke away from the Ptolemaic kingdom, 
establishing a theocratic monarchy with two successive Egyptian pharaohs tied 
to the priesthood in Thebes. Even after this rebel kingdom was re-conquered, 
additional revolts broke out in the countryside around the years 165, 131-130, 
and 88-86 BC. In their repeated wars with the Seleucid Empire over Syria-
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Palestine, the Ptolemies suffered major defeats in 195 and 168 BC. On the 
second occasion, the Seleucid king Antiochus IV conquered all of Egypt except 
Alexandria, proclaimed himself pharaoh, and planned a permanent occupation 
but was forced out by the threat of Roman intervention. Struggles over dynastic 
succession erupted into violence and even civil war in the 200s BC, the 150s, 
the 130s, almost continuously from the 110s to 80s, and finally in the 50s and 
40s BC, when the Romans intervened directly. In connection with these civil 
disturbances were the frequent urban riots in the city of Alexandria such as 
those reported in the years 204, 169, 145, 131, 107, 80, 59 and 48 BC.  
It is against this political background that one has to evaluate the fiscal poli-
cies of the Ptolemaic dynasty. The most influential study of Ptolemaic taxation, 
written in 1939, depicts Egypt as a “royal economy” dominated in virtually all 
sectors by the king. Royal control was supposedly at its apex in the early 
Ptolemaic period and was gradually eroded over time as local elites, especially 
soldiers and the Egyptian priesthood, won more concessions (Préaux 1939; 
Rostovtzeff 1941). On the one hand, it is true that political stability in Egypt 
would have been highest in the early Ptolemaic period, when its rulers could 
count on clear dynastic succession, a large Greco-Macedonian mercenary 
army, and overseas territories to underwrite their power at home. On the other 
hand, the centralization and intrusiveness of the “royal economy” in the early 
Ptolemaic period have been challenged in the last two decades (Rowlandson 
2003; Manning 2005; Bagnall 2007). Manning presents a convincing new 
synthesis of recent work that sees the trend in reverse: initially the Ptolemies 
left intact the traditional administrative and fiscal institutions in the Nile Val-
ley, exchanging privileges for the loyalty of Egyptian temples and local elites, 
but gradually displaced them through a process of bureaucratization in order to 
extract revenue more effectively (Manning 2003). The story of Ptolemaic flour-
ishing and then gradual decline, as depicted by the ancient Greek historian 
Polybius in his history of Rome, may be apt for political history but historians 
are wrong to interpret fiscal institutions through this prism. The Ptolemaic case 
suggests that political strength and intrusive fiscal policies were inversely cor-
related, whereas previous historians assumed that they would go together. 
Levi’s model offers one explanation for this phenomenon.  
A closer analysis of the taxation of grain-producing land in Ptolemaic 
Egypt, undoubtedly the state’s main source of revenue, will amplify this point.  
The monetary policy of the Ptolemies is not considered here but it seems to fit 
the same pattern. The Ptolemaic kings introduced bronze coinage as a fiduciary 
currency to supplement the silver and gold coinage. The bronze coins were 
overvalued relative to their weight in metal and the Ptolemaic kings periodi-
cally assigned higher values to capture revenue while causing price inflation 
that became acute in the second and first centuries BC. Unfortunately, the 
evidence is still too contentious to draw firm conclusions (Reekmans 1951; 
Maresch 1995; Cadell and Le Rider 1997; Bagnall 1999). Even the evidence 
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for the direct taxation of grain-producing land is still too inconsistently pre-
served to evaluate changes in the tax regime in relation to political stability 
within the Ptolemaic period specifically. Hence I do not argue that tax burdens 
tended to become heavier in the second and first centuries BC than in the more 
stable third century BC. Such a hypothesis does follow from the model and is 
consistent with recent research but it remains open to falsification by future 
studies and new evidence. The contrast being drawn here is rather between the 
tax burden in the Ptolemaic period and the tax burden in the Roman period 
after political stability was established.  
For the third century BC little is known about the fiscal regime outside of 
the clearly untypical Fayyum region. It was untypical because massive irriga-
tion and reclamation projects expanded the Fayyum in the third century BC. 
Large areas were allotted for development to royal officials or friends as gift-
estates that stood outside of the regular fiscal administration (Thompson 1998; 
Manning 2003: 110-8). The Fayyum also furnished new land for allotments to 
demobilized or retired Ptolemaic soldiers, who were often charged low fixed 
taxes, typically one artaba of wheat per aroura.1 This would imply one tenth of 
the harvest based on the usual assumption that wheat harvests were about ten 
artabas/aroura in Egypt but clearly large harvest variations were possible 
(Scheidel 2001: 224-31). Other land, designated as royal land, was entrusted to 
villages in the Fayyum in which peasants had customary rights but were not 
private owners and were liable for rents that averaged about three to seven 
artabas of wheat per aroura (Crawford 1971; Monson forthcoming a). The 
pattern in the Fayyum persisted throughout the Ptolemaic period and differs 
markedly from the pattern in the Nile Valley where most land was privately 
owned. There may also have been some royal land with communal tenure 
arrangements in the Nile Valley but if so it is hardly attested and certainly was 
more limited than in the Fayyum (Monson forthcoming a; b). Land endowed to 
temples seems to have been more common in the Nile Valley than in the Fay-
yum but the tenure of temple land is often indistinguishable from private own-
ership, especially in the Nile Valley (Manning 2003: 182-225; Monson 2005). 
The fiscal status of temple land varied apparently by region, some being 
charged a low flat rate like allotments to soldier allotments and some charged 
harvest taxes (Vandorpe 2000: 199). 
As the Ptolemaic fiscal regime in the Nile Valley comes into full view in the 
second and first centuries BC, the property rights of landowners look less se-
cure than their rights to buy, sell, and inherit land would at first suggest. Limit-
ing them were the king’s rights to the harvests at variable rates determined by 
officials (Vandorpe 2000; Muhs 2005: 62-3). This harvest tax is alternatively 
termed the “rent in grain”, which many scholars insist means that owners only 
                                                             
1  One artaba per aroura equals about 109 kg of wheat per hectare; the aroura is .2756 hectares 
and the artaba about 38.78 liters but was not standardized in Egypt and could vary (Pom-
merening 2005: 166-73).  
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leased their land from the king (Vandorpe 2000; Christensen 2002; Monson 
forthcoming a). The assessment of harvest taxes on private land was much like 
that on royal land in the Fayyum. A scribe determined the rate based on the 
quality of the land and the flood conditions at the time of planting and, at least 
in southern Egypt, issued the farmer a receipt (the so-called land office re-
ceipts) for how much wheat he would owe to the state after the harvest. Unpro-
ductive land would be exempt from harvest taxes for that year. The farmer 
enjoyed whatever exceeded this amount, for which he had an incentive to work 
for a good harvest. However, he had little incentive to invest in high quality 
land or in long-term improvements that would raise its productivity since the 
officials could simply raise the tax to whatever they deemed he was able to 
pay. The flat-rate taxes that some soldiers and priests paid for their land en-
tailed higher risk because the entire area rather than only the productive part 
would be assessed but the low rates in relation to rents or harvest taxes on royal 
and private land must have compensated for it, otherwise one could not explain 
why these privileged groups would have preferred them to harvest taxes (Van-
dorpe 2000: 174-5). 
The rate of the harvest tax is known from several regions in the Nile Valley 
and varied between about four to eight artabas of wheat per aroura. A recently 
discovered papyrus contains an extensive land survey from the administrative 
area around Edfu in southern Egypt. According to this text at least 20,000 
arouras, which amounts to nearly half of the Edfu region, were classified as 
private land and assessed the harvest tax at an average rate of 6.34 artabas per 
aroura, whose exact rate varied according to its location. The small areas of 
temple land and land allotted to soldiers mentioned in this text were also as-
sessed harvest taxes at similar rates. The term for harvest tax is only applied to 
private land but the rate and variation of taxes on the other types leave little 
doubt that they were likewise assessed instead of charged the low flat rate 
known for this land elsewhere (Christensen 2002; cf. Crawford 1971). In an 
administrative area called the Herakleopolite further north, the rate was two to 
four artabas of wheat per aroura but these landowners had to pay an additional 
land tax in money (Brashear 1980: 136 n. 1).  
The best series of data for the rate of the harvest tax comes from the so-
called land office receipts known exclusively from southern Egypt around 
Thebes and Pathyris. They date from the early second century BC to 14 AD, 
the end of the reign of Augustus. Vandorpe is the first to interpret these texts 
convincingly and to demonstrate their significance (Vandorpe 2000). The doz-
ens of examples published so far indicate that the rate of the harvest tax in 
these regions varied between four and ten artabas of wheat per aroura (Kap-
lony-Heckel and Kramer 1985; Kaplony-Heckel 1993; 1994; 1999; 2001; Van-
dorpe 2000: 196). The rates for the harvest tax are within the same order of 
magnitude as the rates of rent for cultivators of royal land in the Fayyum and 
thus considerably higher than the flat rates paid by more privileged taxpayers. 
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Like the Edfu land survey, these texts make clear that some temple land also 
paid harvest taxes at comparably high rates even if elsewhere some temple land 
was charged at the privileged flat rate.  
Before turning to the Roman period, the Ptolemaic fiscal regime should be 
considered against the background of political instability. At critical moments 
during or after the revolts, the Ptolemaic kings issued amnesty decrees that 
sought to diffuse tensions by curbing fiscal abuses. The beginning of the reign 
of Ptolemy V (r. 204-180 BC) was particularly uncertain. Not only did rebels 
control most of the southern Egypt, but a new revolt broke out in the Delta, 
which Ptolemy’s generals crushed in battles in 197 and 185 BC and on both 
occasions captured, tortured, and killed its leaders. After the first of these victo-
ries in the Delta and after a successful campaign in the south that recovered 
territory as far as the rebel capital Thebes, the priests loyal to the king con-
vened in Memphis in 197 BC and issued a trilingual decree honoring Ptolemy 
(preserved in the famous Rosetta stone). With it, they publicized an amnesty to 
the effect that rebels who surrendered would retain their property rights to any 
land they owned, presumably in the recovered territory (McGing 1997: 287; 
Austin 2006: 491-6). One month after the news reached Alexandria that the 
revolt in the south had finally been crushed and order was restored, Ptolemy V 
issued a more general amnesty. It forgave crimes, including abuses by officials 
and soldiers of their position, and it relieved unpaid harvest taxes as well as 
rents on royal land.  
This type of amnesty decree was a predictable response in light of the rulers’ 
relatively low discount rates immediately after stability had been restored. 
After the civil war that erupted over the dynastic struggle between Ptolemy 
VIII and his wife/sister Cleopatra II (incestuous marriage was the royal norm) 
lasting from about 131 to 124 BC and subsequent unrest in the following years, 
the reunited royal couple issued joint amnesty decrees in around 118 BC. In 
one of them, they confirmed that private landowners or private persons who 
had been entered into the privileged class of military settlers would retain their 
status and no longer be required to pay harvest taxes on their land or be re-
quired to perform compulsory service (Lenger 1964: 161-6). Presumably, it 
means that they would pay instead the one-artaba land tax as well as be exempt 
from corvée labor on the irrigation canals. In a much longer amnesty decree 
from around the same year, the rulers promised a number of fiscal and adminis-
trative reforms to alleviate the pressure on the productive population (Lenger 
1964: 128-158; Austin 2006: 501-8). Among them were the usual vows to curb 
abuse by officials and tax collectors and to provide landowners with relief from 
excessive taxation and forced lease of royal land. This text has been used to 
support the thesis that Ptolemaic revolts were caused by official abuse, corrup-
tion, and excessive taxation. That the amnesties relate to the chaos during the 
revolts suggest that the causality runs in the opposite direction. Political insta-
bility raised the discount rates of both rulers and their agents. Mistrust, ethnic 
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tension, insecurity, and civil unrest were endemic until the end of the Ptolemaic 
dynasty. 
4. Fiscal Reform in Roman Egypt 
Egypt’s development after its incorporation into the Roman Empire in 30 BC is 
what throws the Ptolemaic fiscal regime into sharp relief. While Levi’s model 
provides an explanatory framework for Ptolemaic political history, the evi-
dence for this period is still insufficient (partly because so many Egyptian texts 
are unpublished) to assess fluctuations in tax policy over time. It remains only a 
hypothesis that the Ptolemaic rulers and their agents manipulated fiscal institu-
tions to maximize revenue in response to particular crises. On the other hand, 
taking a broader view of the differences between the Ptolemaic and Roman 
regimes presents clear contrasts for analysis. If Levi’s hypothesis is right then 
increased political stability in the Roman period should have led to more favor-
able fiscal policies for the productive population than in the Ptolemaic period. 
If the alternative hypothesis is correct, that rulers will adopt more intrusive 
fiscal policies when the elimination of rivals gives them a freer hand, then we 
should expect the burden of taxation in Roman Egypt to remain constant or 
increase. The case of Egypt suggests that the lower discount rate of the early 
emperors Augustus and Tiberius led them to adopt the former strategy with 
positive results for agricultural intensification and economic growth. 
The crux of the argument is the elimination of harvest taxes on private land 
and the introduction of low flat land taxes. There is no text that refers directly 
to this reform but it is an inevitable conclusion based on official land registers, 
receipts, and accounts from the early Roman period. It is widely accepted that 
private land in Roman Egypt was assessed the so-called one-artaba tax, a flat 
rate of usually one artaba per aroura (Wallace 1938: 11-19). Contrary to earlier 
scholarship, studies since the 1970s rightly emphasize that the largest share of 
land in Roman Egypt was private land (Rowlandson 1996: 63-9; Monson 
forthcoming b). The Roman administration in the reign of Augustus reformed 
the various fiscal categories under two main headings: public and private land. 
In some regions, notably the Fayyum, much of the private land can be traced 
back to the allotments to soldiers in the Ptolemaic period, which were fre-
quently (though not always) taxed at the privileged rate of one artaba and 
which already had largely become de facto private property. Land could also 
become private by purchasing public land from the state. However, only recent 
research, which shows that private land or de facto private temple land was 
already extensive in the Nile Valley during the Ptolemaic period, can explain 
the large proportion of private land in the early Roman period (Monson 2005; 
forthcoming b; cf. Capponi 2005: 103).  
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The difference is that Ptolemaic private landowners paid harvest taxes at 
variable rates of four to eight artabas per aroura while Roman private land-
owners paid the one-artaba tax. The last datable land office receipts for the 
harvest tax date to the final year of the reign of Augustus, which suggests that 
the fiscal reforms took place at the beginning of the reign of the emperor Ti-
berius (Kaplony-Heckel 1999). This would fit conveniently with the anecdotes 
in Dio Cassius’ history and Suetonius’ biography of Tiberius. The governor of 
Egypt raised considerably more tax revenue than had been expected but Ti-
berius scolded him with the command: “I want my sheep sheared, not flayed” 
(Dio Cassius, Roman History LVII 10; Suetonius, Tiberius 32 has him address-
ing his governors generally). While hardly evidence for specific reforms, it 
betrays a self-conscious recognition of the ruler’s low discount rate. The fiscal 
reforms for private land in Egypt must predate 47 AD because a land survey 
from southern Egypt is preserved that gives the complete information about 
landholdings and tax rates in one village in that year (Kenyon and Bell 1907: 
70-6; Wallace 1938: 16-7; Monson forthcoming b). According to that text, 78% 
of the village was charged variations of the one-artaba tax or, more precisely, 
56% at one artaba, 21% at ¾ artaba, and 1% at other rates. The remaining 22% 
was public land, or royal land as it was often still called. The tax regime on 
public land remained like it was in the Ptolemaic period: farmers paid rent to 
the state that varied at high levels essentially like the harvest tax and subject to 
the same abuses by officials (Wallace 1938: 11; Sharp 1999: 238-9). Several 
Roman decrees attempted to remedy these abuses by ordering officials to in-
spect the land each year rather than apply high rates inflexibly (Chalon 1964, 
edict of the Egyptian prefect T. Julius Alexander in 68 AD; Kornemann and 
Meyer 1912: 22-38, edict of the emperor Hadrian in 117 AD). However, the 
area of land subject to this fiscal regime was far more limited than in the 
Ptolemaic period. 
The Tiberian strategy, to shear the sheep rather than flay them, paid off in 
Egypt. Several scholars have argued recently that Egypt experienced not only 
population growth but also per capita economic growth during the Roman 
period. A study of Roman census declarations from Egypt, for example, sug-
gests demographic growth at about 0-0.5% annually (Bagnall and Frier 1994: 
81-90). Based on various estimates, urbanization may have reached by the third 
century AD a level not surpassed until the late nineteenth or twentieth century 
(Tacoma 2006: 37-68). What made this growth possible was partly the increase 
in trade and urban crafts in Egypt as it was integrated into the Roman Empire 
(Bagnall 2005). Egypt became among other things an entrepôt for the Indian 
luxury trade via the Red Sea (Rathbone 2001). Most importantly, economic 
growth would have been due to the intensification of agriculture on private 
estates. Rathbone argues convincingly that private property rights in Roman 
Egypt gave farmers an incentive to invest in land and to make improvements. 
He points to the diffusion of water lifting technologies, which had already been 
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known in Ptolemaic Egypt but became widespread on private estates only in 
the Roman period (Rathbone 2007a; 2007b).  
Previous explanations for the growth and development of private estates in 
Roman Egypt suppose that the Romans extended the private ownership of land 
in Egypt for the first time. This underestimates how much land could already 
be legally bought, sold, inherited, and leased in the Ptolemaic period. The 
change of fiscal regime has not adequately been taken into account. To illus-
trate this point, Chart 1 presents a series of data, albeit a small sample, for the 
sale price of private land in the southern Egyptian town of Pathyris (Cadell 
1994). What we know about this land is that it was normal grain-producing 
land whose owners had private rights of conveyance and that it was assessed 
the harvest tax. For comparison, Chart 2 shows prices of land in Roman Egypt 
(Drexhage 1991: 127-35).  
These data present problems, not least controlling for the quality of the land, 
but sufficiently convey the order of magnitude. What makes them so difficult 
to compare is the aforementioned price inflation in the Ptolemaic period, par-
ticularly during the second and first centuries BC. The prices must be con-
verted from overvalued bronze drachmas, whose weight is not securely known, 
to silver drachmas (weighing about 3.575 g). Assuming equal weight of the 
drachmas and no fiduciary value, bronze to silver is thought to be valued at 
about 125:1 based purely on the metal content but this is probably a minimum 
because the bronze drachma was almost certainly overvalued and probably also 
heavier (Bagnall 1999: 202-3). The ratio of grain prices reckoned in late 
Ptolemaic bronze drachmas (118-93 BC) to grain prices reckoned in silver 
drachmas in the first century AD is about 155:1, which would imply an average 
land price of 60 silver drachmas in Ptolemaic Pathyris.2 The notional ratio 
according to conversions in late Ptolemaic contracts is 300:1, which implies an 
average of 31 silver drachmas and is the ratio used in Chart 1 (Maresch 1995: 
111, 205). The attested direct conversions of bronze to silver drachmas during 
the period 115-79 BC average to about 450:1, giving a land price of 21 silver 
drachmas (Maresch 1995: 196-8). 
Whatever realistic ratio is used, the result is the same: the price of land in 
Ptolemaic Pathyris was 5 to 15 times lower than in the Roman period. Maresch 
(1995: 85-7) assumes that land prices would have been the same in Ptolemaic 
and Roman Egypt and uses these data to support his questionable interpretation 
of Ptolemaic money values and terminology (Cadell and Le Rider 1997: 70-73 
and Bagnall 1999: 200-1). The low price of land has also been noted in 
pharaonic Egypt but not sufficiently explained (Baer 1962). The fiscal regime 
of variable and relatively high harvest taxes, which also applied in earlier peri-
ods of Egyptian history, may partially account for it (Vandorpe 2000, 2007). 
Similarly, private leasing, and hence the possibility for larger accumulations of 
                                                             
2  Average grain price, 118-93 BC, is 1364 bronze drachmas (Maresch 1995: 192); the first 
century AD average is 8.8 silver drachmas (Drexhage 1991: 20).  
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land, tends to be associated with land charged the one-artaba tax in Ptolemaic 
Egypt such as soldiers’ allotments or temple land that had a privileged fiscal 
status. Hence the tax reforms in early Roman Egypt would have raised the 
demand for investment in private land. As a result, it is possible to observe 
wealthy urban residents, including Alexandrians and even Romans, buying up 
estates in the Egyptian countryside and leasing them out, which would have 
been hardly profitable and much more difficult to administer under the harvest 
tax regime. In Ptolemaic Egypt, only land in special fiscal categories presented 
similar incentives for development but it tended to be allocated by status and 
royal favor rather than by markets. 
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The Roman fiscal reforms in Egypt have to be seen against the political 
backdrop of relative stability. The conquest of Egypt was followed by a revolt 
of the southern city of Thebes. Fuks (1953: 141-9) shows that the Jewish revolt 
of 115-7 AD spread to the countryside but non-Jewish Egyptian landowners 
and peasants remained loyal to the state. But aside from these, there was not 
another major Egyptian insurrection in the countryside until second half of the 
second century AD, in 152 and 172 AD (Lewis 1983: 196-207). The second of 
these broke out in the Delta around the time of the Antonine plague when one 
of the Egyptian legions was away in Germany. It required aid from the Roman 
commander in Syria but supposedly fizzled out due to internal disunity among 
the rebels (Dio Cassius, Roman History 72.4; Lewis 1983: 205). It is difficult to 
separate myth from reality since our account of this so-called “revolt of the 
bandits” (boukoloi) was probably influenced and embellished by popular myths 
(Alston 1999). Nevertheless, Rome’s ability to draw on such external forces 
illustrates the strength of its position in Egypt relative to the Ptolemaic dynasty, 
which would have been a deterrent to revolt. That is not to say that law and 
order always prevailed in Egypt. Lacking the power base for organized rebel-
lion, the disaffected turned to banditry, a threat that Roman governors faced 
throughout the empire (Shaw 1984). Moreover, the Alexandrian mob was fa-
mously prone to riot but that was typical for large ancient cities and especially 
for one of this size, second only to Rome in the empire. Such urban violence 
has to be interpreted as a means to extract concessions from calculating politi-
cal elites resident in the city who redistribute wealth from the countryside. 
5. Conclusion 
In summary, Levi’s model generates the hypothesis that the transition from the 
turbulent late Republic to the Principate would have been accompanied by 
fiscal reforms that eased the tax burden on periphery. Generally, political elites 
tend to overtax outer provincial and rural areas and to favor politically sensitive 
core and urban areas. The more unstable their political situation, the higher 
their discount rates become, causing them to extract more revenue or to ensure 
immediate survival despite long-term negative consequences for future revenue 
or survival. The same applies to subordinate agents and officials who would be 
more tempted to abuse their position to capture revenue as the regime itself 
became less stable. Egypt’s transition from Ptolemaic to Roman rule provides a 
good case study. It suggests a significant break with the fiscal regime of the 
Ptolemaic period. The relatively low tax burden for landowners in Roman 
Egypt demands an explanation. It seems to falsify the hypothesis that political 
stability in the Principate would have caused the emperors to extract even 
higher revenues because they had a freer hand. Rather it supports the thesis that 
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provincial subjects of the Roman Empire would have profited from a peace 
dividend as rulers had lower discount rates. 
The model is open to criticism because it is difficult to specify in empirical 
terms a precise measure for political instability. Moreover, there are other 
assets besides revenue that rulers or political elites might value and that might 
motivate them to adopt policies that do not conform to the predictions of the 
model. The first limitation forces the analysis to remain at a fairly general 
macro-historical level, comparing fiscal regimes of the Republic and the Prin-
cipate of Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt. The second limitation is intrinsic to 
rational choice models that simplify reality in order to illustrate specific rela-
tionships. They may be as useful for spotting deviations from the postulated 
trends as for identifying correlations. Hence the rational choice approach is just 
one of several promising methods for identifying the determinants of fiscal 
institutions. 
There are other potential causes for the elimination of harvest taxes in Ro-
man Egypt that have admittedly not been treated here adequately. One is the 
potential advantage of flat taxes relative to variable harvest taxes in terms of 
measurement and enforcement costs. The latter fiscal regime requires officials 
to inspect the fields regularly in order to keep the tax burden fairly distributed 
but also demands oversight of the officials in order to prevent abuses. The 
switch to flat taxes on private land in the Roman period corresponds with a 
more gradual shift away from centralized bureaucracy toward a liturgical sys-
tem in Egypt where the now fiscally privileged landowners who met certain 
property qualifications were required to discharge official functions at their 
own expense. An attempt to lower administration and agency costs might have 
been a contributing factor but so might the Roman emperors’ fear of an auto-
cratic Egyptian governor and a centralized bureaucracy with fiscal powers to 
match those of an Egyptian king. Such a regime might pose greater threats to 
Rome than one administered by a governor of lower status (senators were 
barred from Egypt) and by local elites rather than officials. 
Another potential cause of reform is the role that culture plays in the forma-
tion of fiscal policies. This article can be seen partly as a reaction to ancient 
historians’ overemphasis on cultural explanations for political and economic 
institutions. It rejects above all the thesis that Ptolemaic fiscal policy was de-
termined by the degeneracy and hedonism of the later Ptolemaic rulers that 
ancient writers ridiculed. However, it was consistent with ancient Egyptian 
religious traditions, at least as they are represented by self-interested royal and 
priestly elites, that land belonged ultimately to the divine king or to the temples 
of the gods. This notion might well have been used to legitimize violations of 
private property rights and the collection of the harvest tax, which in Ptolemaic 
Egypt was synonymous with rent (Manning 2003: 157-60). Roman society, by 
contrast, was dominated by landowning urban elites who regarded redistribu-
tion and even the taxation of their rural estates by the state as a vicious attack 
 269
on property rights (Cicero, On Duties II 73-4; Chiusi 2005). In these ideologi-
cal differences some historians find an explanation for the apparent expansion 
of private land in Roman Egypt but they are vague about the process of the 
cultural transmission (Lewis 1970: 8). 
The Roman governors and local magistrates of Egypt undoubtedly modeled 
their civic and fiscal institutions more on Greco-Roman traditions than Egyp-
tian ones. However, this line of argument exaggerates the significance of royal 
ownership in Ptolemaic Egypt underestimates the extent of private land. One 
cannot deny that individuals often respond predictably to resource scarcity and 
fiscal incentives and that private property rights and analogous taxation re-
gimes can evolve in different societies without cultural influence. The rational 
choice approach is a corrective against culturally deterministic explanations but 
cannot ignore culture altogether. Part of its usefulness of historical analysis is 
to identify and control for how decisions are shaped by contingent preferences, 
beliefs, and historical situations while it aims to test rational choice models 
about how individuals will react to given circumstances. 
References∗ 
Ades, Alberto F./Glaeser, Edward F. (1995): “Trade and Circuses: Explaining 
Urban Giants”. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics. 110 (1). S. 195-227. 
Alston, Richard (1999): “The Revolt of the Boukoloi: Geography, History, and 
Myth”. In: Hopwood, Keith (Hg.): Organized Crime in Antiquity. London. 
S. 129-53. 
Ardant, Gabriel (1971): L’histoire de l’impôt. Livre I: De l’antiquité au XVIIe 
siècle. Paris.  
Austin, Michael (2006): The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Con-
quest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation. Cambridge. 
Badian, Ernst (1972): Publicans and Sinners: Private Enterprise in the Service of 
the Roman Republic. Oxford. 
Baer, Klaus (1962): “The Low Price of Land in Ancient Egypt”. In: Journal of the 
American Research Center in Egypt. 1. S. 25-45. 
Bagnall, Roger S. (1995): Reading Papyri Writing Ancient History. London. 
Bagnall, Roger S. (1999): “Review of Hélène Cadell and Georges Le Rider, Prix du 
blé et numéraire dans l’Égypte lagide de 305 à 173”. In: Schweizerische Numis-
matische Rundschau. 78. S. 197-203. 
Bagnall, Roger S. (2005): “Evidence and Models for the Economy of Roman 
Egypt”. In: Manning, Joseph G./Morris, Ian (Hg.): The Ancient Economy: Evi-
dence and Models. Stanford. S. 197-204. 
                                                             
∗  The ancient authors cited in the notes are widely available, for example, in the series of the 
Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, or via the Perseus Project at Tufts Uni-
versity (www.perseus.tufts.edu). 
 270
Bagnall, Roger S. (2007): “Introduction: Jean Bingen and the Currents of Ptolemaic 
History”. In: Bingen, Jean (Hg.): Hellenistic Egypt: Monarchy, Society, Econ-
omy, Culture. Berkeley. S. 1-12. 
Bagnall, Roger S./Frier, Bruce W. (1994): The Demography of Roman Egypt. 
Cambridge. 
Bartlett, Bruce (1994): “How Excessive Government Killed Ancient Rome”. In: 
Cato Journal. 14 (2). S. 287-303. 
Bates, Robert H. (1981): Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis 
of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley. 
Bowman, Alan K./Rathbone, Dominic (1992): “Cities and Administration in Ro-
man Egypt”. In: Journal of Roman Studies. 82. S. 107-127. 
Brashear, William M. (1980): Ptolemäische Urkunden aus Mumienkartonage. 
Berlin. 
Brennan, Geoffrey/Buchanan, James M. (1980): The Power to Tax: Analytical 
Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge.  
Brunt, Peter A. (1981): “The Revenues of Rome”. In: Journal of Roman Studies. 
71. S. 161-72. Reprinted. In: Brunt, Peter A. (1990): Roman Imperial Themes. 
Oxford. S. 324-46. 
Brunt, Peter A. (1990): “Publicans in the Principate”. In: Brunt, Peter A.: Roman 
Imperial Themes, Oxford. S. 354-432. 
Cadell, Hélène (1994): “Le prix de vente des terres dans l’Égypte ptolémaïque 
d’après les papyrus grecs”. In: Allam, Schafik (Hg.): Grund und Boden in Alt-
ägypten (rechliche und sozio-ökonomische Verhältnisse). Tübingen. S. 289-306. 
Cadell, Hélène/Le Rider, Georges (1997): Prix du blé et numéraire dans l’Égypte 
lagide de 305 à 173. Bruxelles. 
Campbell, John L. (1993): “The State and Fiscal Sociology”. In: Annual Review of 
Sociology. 19. S. 163-85. 
Capponi, Livia (2005): Augustan Egypt: The Creation of a Roman Province. Lon-
don. 
Chalon, Gérard (1964): L’édit de Tiberius Julius Alexander. Étude historique et 
exégétique. Lausanne. 
Chiusi, Tiziana J. (2005): „Strukturen des römischen Eigentums im Spiegel rheto-
risch-philosophischer Texte Ciceros“. In: Eckl, Andreas/Ludwig, Bernd (Hg.): 
Was ist Eigentum? Philosophische Positionen von Platon bis Habermas. Munich. 
S. 59-72. 
Christensen, Thorolf (2002): The Edfu Nome Surveyed: P. Haun. Inv. 407 (119-118 
B.C.). Ph.D. Dissertation. Cambridge University. 
Christol, Michel (2006): “Les outils de la fiscalité: l’arrière-plan romain”. In: Ri-
gaudière, Albert et al. (Hg.): De l’estime au cadastre en Europe. Le Moyen Âge. 
Colloque des 11, 12 et 13 juin 2003. Paris. S. 25-58.  
De Ligt, Luuk (2004): “Direct Taxation in Western Asia Minor”. In: de Ligt, Luuk 
et al. (Hg.): Roman Rule and Civic Life: Local and Regional Perspectives. Ams-
terdam. S. 77-93. 
Drexhage, Hans-Joachim (1991): Preise, Mieten/Pachten, Kosten und Löhne im 
römischen Ägypten bis zum Regierungsantritt Diokletians. St. Katharinen. 
Eich, Armin/Eich, Peter (2005): “War and State-Building in Roman Republican 
Times”. In: Scripta Classica Israelica. 24. S. 1-33. 
 271
Erdkamp, Paul P.M. (2002): “’A Starving Mob Has No Respect’: Urban Markets 
and Food Riots in the Roman World, 100 B.C. – 400 A.D”. In: de Blois, Lu-
cas/Rich, John (Hg.): The Transformation of Economic Life under the Roman 
Empire. Amsterdam. S. 93-115. 
Fuks, Alexander (1953): “The Jewish Revolt in Egypt (A.D. 115-117) in Light of 
the Papyri”. In: Aegyptus. 33. S. 131-58. 
Garnsey, Peter (1988): Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: 
Responses to Risk and Crisis. Cambridge. 
Goffart, Walter (1974): Caput and Colonate: Towards a History of Late Roman 
Taxation. Toronto. 
Goldsmith, Raymond W. (1987): Premodern Financial Systems: A Historical Com-
parative Study. Cambridge. 
Goldstone, Jack A. (1991): Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. 
Berkeley. 
Green, Peter (1990): Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Helle-
nistic Age. Berkeley. 
Hölbl, Günter (2001): A History of the Ptolemaic Empire. London. 
Jones, Arnold Hugh Martin (1974): “Taxation in Antiquity”. In: Jones, Arnold 
H.M.: The Roman Economy: Studies of Ancient Economic and Administrative 
History, Oxford. S. 151-186. 
Kaplony-Heckel, Ursula (1993): „Theben-Ost I“. In: Zeitschrift für Ägyptische 
Sprache und Altertumskunde. 120. S. 42-71. 
Kaplony-Heckel, Ursula (1994): „Thebanische Acker-Amt-Quittungen“. In: Allam, 
Schafik. (Hg.): Grund und Boden in Altägypten (rechtliche und sozio-
ökonomische Verhältnisse). Tübingen. S. 189-197. 
Kaplony-Heckel, Ursula (1999): „Theben-Ost II“. In: Zeitschrift für Ägyptische 
Sprache und Altertumskunde. 126. S. 41-54. 
Kaplony-Heckel, Ursula (2001): „Theben-Ost III“. In: Zeitschrift für Ägyptische 
Sprache und Altertumskunde. 129. S. 24-40. 
Kaplony-Heckel, Ursula/Kramer, Bärbel (1985): „Ein griechisch-demotisches 
Holztäfelchen mit Sitologenquittung und Privatabrechnung für Epigraphe aus 
Krokodilopolis“. In: Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik. 61. S. 43-57. 
Kenyon, Frederic G./Bell, Harold I. (1907): Greek Papyri in the British Museum, 
III. London. 
Kiser, Edgar (1994): “Markets and Hierarchies in Early Modern Tax Systems: A 
Principal-Agent Analysis”. In: Politics & Society. 22. S. 284-315. 
Kornemann, Ernst/Meyer, Paul M. (1912): Griechische Papyri im Museum des 
oberhessischen Geschichtsvereins zu Giessen, I. Leipzig. 
Lenger, Marie-Thérèse (1964): Corpus des Ordonnances des Ptolémées 
(C.Ord.Ptol.). Bruxelles. 
Levi, Margaret (1988): Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley. 
Lewis, Naphtali (1970): “Graeco-Roman Egypt: Fact or Fiction?”. In: Samuel, 
Deborah H. (Hg.): Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress of Papyrol-
ogy. Toronto. S. 3-14. Reprinted in: Lewis, Naphtali (1995): On Government and 
Law: Collected Essays of Naphtali Lewis. Atlanta. S. 138-49. 
Lewis, Naphtali (1983): Life in Egypt under Roman Rule. Oxford. 
Lewis, Naphtali (1984): “The Romanity of Roman Egypt: A Growing Consensus”. 
In: Atti del XVII Congresso internazionale di Papirologia. Naples. S. 1077-84. 
 272
Reprinted in: Lewis, Naphtali (1995): On Government and Law: Collected Es-
says of Naphtali Lewis. Atlanta. S. 298-305. 
Malmendier, Ulrike (2002): Societas publicanorum: Staatliche Wirtschaftsaktivitä-
ten in den Händen privater Unternehmer. Cologne.  
Mann, Michael (1988): “State and Society, 1130-1815: An Analysis of English 
State Finances”. In: Mann, Michael (Hg.): States, War, and Capitalism. London. 
S. 73-123. 
Manning, Joseph G. (2003): Land and Power in Ptolemaic Egypt: The Structure of 
Land Tenure. Cambridge. 
Manning, Joseph G. (2005): “The Relationship of Evidence to Models in the Ptole-
maic Economy”. In: Manning, Joseph G./Morris, Ian (Hg.): The Ancient Econ-
omy: Evidence and Models. Stanford. S. 163-86. 
Manning, Joseph G./Morris, Ian (Hg.) (2005): The Ancient Economy: Evidence and 
Models. Stanford. 
Maresch, Klaus (1996): „Bronze und Silber: Papyrologische Beiträge zur Geschich-
te der Währung im ptolemäischen und römischen Ägypten bis zum 2. Jahrhundert 
n. Chr“. In: Papyrologica Coloniensia. 25. Cologne. 
McGing, Brian C. (1997): “Revolt Egyptian Style: Internal Opposition to Ptolemaic 
Rule”. In: Archiv für Papyrusforschung. 43 (2). S. 273-314. 
Milne, J. Graflon (1927): “The Ruin of Egypt by Roman Mismanagement”. In: 
Journal of Roman Studies. 17. S. 1-13. 
Monson, Andrew (2005): “Sacred Land in Ptolemaic and Roman Tebtunis”. In: 
Lippert, Sandra/Schentuleit, Maren (Hg.): Tebtynis und Soknopaiu Nesos: Leben 
im römerzeitlichen Fajum. Wiesbaden. S. 79-91. 
Monson, Andrew (forthcoming a): “Royal Land in Ptolemaic Egypt: A Demo-
graphic Model”. In: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. 50 
(4). 
Monson, Andrew (forthcoming b): “Communal Agriculture in the Ptolemaic and 
Roman Fayyum”. In: Lippert, Sandra/Schentuleit, Maren (Hg.): Greco-Roman 
Fayyum: Texts and Archaeology. Wiesbaden. 
Morris, Ian/Manning, Joseph G. (2005): “The Economic Sociology of the Ancient 
Mediterranean World”. In: Smelser, Neil J./Swedberg, Richard (Hg.): The Hand-
book of Economic Sociology. Second Edition. Princeton. S. 131-159.  
Morris, Ian/Saller, Richard/Scheidel, Walter (2007): “Introduction”. In: Scheidel, 
Walter/Morris, Ian/Saller, Richard (Hg.): The Cambridge Economic History of 
the Greco-Roman World. Cambridge. S. 1-12. [forthcoming] 
Morris, Ian/Weingast Barry R. (2004): “Institutions, Economics, and the Ancient 
Mediterranean World”. In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 
160 (4). S. 702-8. 
Muhs, Brian (2005): “Tax Receipts, Taxpayers, and Taxes in Early Ptolemaic 
Thebes”. In: Oriental Institute Publications. 126. Chicago.  
Neesen, Lutz (1980): Untersuchungen zu den direkten Staatsabgaben der römischen 
Kaiserzeit. Bonn. 
Ober, Josiah (forthcoming): “Democratic Athens as an Experimental System: His-
tory and the Project of Political Theory”. In: Creager, Angela et al. (Hg.): Science 
without Laws: Model Systems, Cases and Exemplary Narratives. Durham. 
Oertel, Friedrich (1934): “The Economic Unification of the Mediterranean Region: 
Industry, Trade, and Commerce”. In: Cook, Stanley A. et al. (Hg.): The  
 273
Cambridge Ancient History, Volume X: The Augustan Empire. Cambridge. S. 
382-424. 
Olson, Mancur (1993): “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development”. In: Ameri-
can Political Science Review. 87 (3). S. 567-76. 
Olson, Mancur (2000): Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capital-
ist Dictatorships. New York. 
Peremans, W. (1978): “Les revolutions égyptiennes sous les Lagides”. In: Maehler, 
Herwig/Strocka, Volker Michael (Hg.): Das ptolemäische Ägypten. Akten des 
internationalen Symposions 27.-29. September 1976 in Berlin. Mainz. S. 39-50. 
Persson, Torsten/Tabellini, Guido (2000): Political Economics: Explaining Eco-
nomic Policy. Cambridge. 
Pommerening, Tanja (2005): „Die altägyptischen Hohlmaße“. In: Studien zur alt-
ägyptischen Kultur. Beiheft. 10. Hamburg. 
Préaux, Claire (1936): “Esquisse d’une histoire des revolutions égyptiennes sous les 
Lagides”. In: Chronique d’Égypte. 11. S. 522-52. 
Préaux, Claire (1939): L’économie royale des Lagides. Bruxelles. 
Quillin, James M. (2002): Imaginary Invasions of Italy: Fear Propaganda, Consen-
sus, and Imperialism, 200-146 B.C. Ph.D. Dissertation. Stanford University. 
Quillin, James M. (2004): “Information and Empire: Domestic Fear Propaganda in 
Republican Rome, 200-149 BCE”. In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics. 160 (4). S. 765-85. 
Rathbone, Dominic W. (1989): “The Ancient Economy and Graeco-Roman Egypt”. 
In: Criscuolo, Lucia/Geraci, Giovanni (Hg.): Egitto e storia antica dell’ellenismo 
all’età araba. Bilanco di un confronto. Bologna. S. 159-76. Reprinted in: Schei-
del, Walter/von Reden, Sitta (Hg.): The Ancient Economy. New York. S. 155-69. 
Rathbone, Dominic W. (1993): “Egypt, Augustus and Roman Taxation”. In: Ca-
hiers du Centre Gustav Glotz. 4. S. 81-112. 
Rathbone, Dominic W. (1996): “The Imperial Finances”. In: Bowman, Alan et al. 
(Hg.): The Cambridge Ancient History, Second Edition, Volume X: The Augus-
tan Empire, 43 B.C.–A.D. 69. Cambridge. S. 309-23. 
Rathbone, Dominic W. (2000): “Ptolemaic to Roman Egypt: The Death of the 
Dirigiste State?”. In: Lo Cascio, Elio/Rathbone, Dominic (Hg.): Production and 
Public Powers in Classical Antiquity. Cambridge Philological Society Supple-
mentary. 26. Cambridge. S. 44-54. 
Rathbone, Dominic W. (2001): “The ‘Muziris’ Papyrus (SB XVIII 13167): Financ-
ing Roman Trade with India”. In: Abd-el-Ghani, Mohammed et al. (Hg.): Alex-
andrian Studies II in Honor of Mostafa el Abbadi. Alexandria. S. 39-50. 
Rathbone, Dominic W. (2007a): “Mechanai (Waterwheels) in the Roman Fayyum.” 
In: Capasso, Mario/Davoli, Paola (Hg.): New Archaeological and Papyrological 
Researches on the Fayyum. Lecce. S. 251-62. 
Rathbone, Dominic W. (2007b): “Roman Egypt”. In: Scheidel, Walter/Morris, 
Ian/Saller, Richard (Hg.): The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman 
World. Cambridge. S. 698-719. 
Reekmans, Tony (1951): “The Ptolemaic Copper Inflation”. In: Studia Hellenistica. 
7. S. 61-119. 
Rostovtzeff, Michael I. (1957): The Social and Economic History of the Roman 
Empire. Second Edition. Oxford [1926].  
 274
Rostovtzeff, Michael I. (1929): “Roman Exploitation of Egypt in the First Century 
A.D”. In: Journal of Economic and Business History. 1 (3). S. 337-64. 
Rostovtzeff, Michael I. (1941): The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic 
World. Oxford. 
Scheidel, Walter (2001): Death on the Nile: Disease and the Demography of Roman 
Egypt. Leiden. 
Scheidel, Walter (2007): “A Model of Real Income Growth in Roman Italy”. In: 
Historia. 56. S. 322-46. 
Sharp, Michael (1999): “Shearing Sheep: Rome and the Collection of Taxes in 
Egypt, 30 BC – AD 200”. In: Eck, Werner (Hg.): Lokale Autonomie und römi-
sche Ordnungsmacht in den kaiserzeitlichen Provinzen vom 1. bis 3. Jahrhundert. 
Munich. S. 213-41. 
Shaw, Brent D. (1984): “Bandits in the Roman Empire”. In: Past and Present. 105. 
S. 3-52. 
Skocpol, Theda (1979): States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative History of 
France, Russia, and China. Cambridge. 
Swedberg, Richard (2003): The Principles of Economic Sociology. Princeton. 
Tacoma, Laurens E. (2006): Fragile Hierarchies: The Urban Elites of Third-Century 
Roman Egypt. Leiden. 
Thompson, Dorothy J. (1998): “Irrigation and Drainage in the Early Ptolemaic 
Fayyum”. In: Bowman, Alan K./Rogan, Eugene (Hg.): Agriculture in Egypt from 
Pharaonic to Modern Times. Oxford. S.107-22. 
Tilly, Charles (1992): Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990. Ox-
ford. 
Vandorpe, Katelijn (2000): “The Ptolemaic Epigraphe or Harvest Tax (shemu)”. In: 
Archiv für Papyrusforschung. 46 (2). S. 169-232. 
Vandorpe, Katelijn (2007): “Agriculture, Temples and Tax Law in Ptolemaic 
Egypt”. In: García, Juan C.M. (Hg.): L’agriculture institutionnelle en Égypte an-
cienne: état de la question et perspectives interdisciplinaires. Villeneuve d’Ascq. 
S. 165-71. 
Veïsse, Anne-Emmanuelle (2004): “Les ‘révoltes égyptiennes’: recherches sur les 
troubles intérieurs en Égypte du règne de Ptolémée III à la conquête romaine”. In: 
Studia Hellenistica. 41. Leuven. 
Wallace, Sherman LeRoy (1938): Taxation in Roman Egypt. Princeton. 
Weber, Max (1968): Economy and Society. Berkeley. 
Weingast, Barry (2002): “Rational-Choice Institutionalism”. In: Katznelson, 
Ira/Milner, Helen V. (Hg.): Political Science: The State of the Discipline. New 
York. S. 660-92. 
Weingast, Barry R./Wittman, Donald A. (2006): “Introduction: The Reach of Po-
litical Economy”. In: Weingast, Barry R./Wittman, Donald A. (Hg.): The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford. S. 3-25. 
